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1Introduction
P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty 
in the Arctic; either we use it or we lose it. And make no mis-
take this government intends to use it. Because Canada’s Arctic 
is central to our national identity as a northern nation. It is part 
of our history. And it represents the tremendous potential of our 
future.
— Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 9 July 20071 
Climate change is transforming the Arctic. The ice cover on the Arctic Ocean is shrinking in breadth and depth, permafrost is melting, and indigenous flora and fauna is threatened. Questions abound 
about what these changes will mean for northern peoples, for transporta-
tion routes, for international boundaries, and for stability and security in the 
circumpolar world. 
 Prime Minister Harper, in his campaign speeches and announcements 
of major initiatives delivered in northern communities, has often repeated 
the message of “use it or lose it.” Canada must respond to present and fu-
ture challenges, this message intimates, because Canada’s north is besieged.2 
The line of argument is predicated on the idea that previous governments 
have failed to perfect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, and a more activ-
ist approach is necessary to defend Canada’s national interests. Is Canada’s 
sovereignty “on thinning ice”? Are new circumpolar threats undermining 
Canadian security? As debate swirls around these questions, due to an al-
legedly impending “perfect storm” coalescing around climate change, a 
so-called “race” for arctic resources, and increased militarism in the Arctic,3 
Canadians should be reminded that scholars and policy-makers have been 
grappling with these questions for decades. The Arctic is indeed part of our 
history, as the prime minister noted, and a robust understanding of previous 
sovereignty and security thinking, policy, and practices should inform our 
assessment of policy options, probable future scenarios, and the feasibility of 
proposed courses of action. 
 The purpose of this volume is to provide an overview of leading histor-
ical research on Canadian Arctic security and sovereignty since the Second 
World War. It is a “hybrid” collection in that it includes both previously 
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published scholarship and cutting edge research by new scholars. We hope 
that it provides students, scholars, and policy makers with access to import-
ant scholarship that frames and shapes historiographical and policy debates 
about sovereignty and security in the Canadian Arctic. In so doing, we hope 
that it lays a foundation for future research in this important and dynamic 
field. Although there is some modest overlap in discussions of historical con-
text across some chapters, this has been retained in anticipation that individ-
ual chapters may be consulted as stand-alone contributions on specific topics 
and themes. 
 The basic organizing framework for this volume is chronological, with 
each chapter pursuing a distinct theme. Chapters 1-2 introduce military de-
velopment and sovereignty concerns in the Canadian Northwest during the 
Second World War. The main emphasis of the volume is on the Cold War, 
during which strategist Ken Eyre identified three surges of military interest 
in the Canadian Arctic.4 He suggested that the first, which treated the Arctic 
as an “exposed flank” rather than a place of intrinsic value, ran from 1947-64. 
Chapters 3-10 chart military, diplomatic, and political developments through 
this phase, which most authors suggest actually began in 1946. The second 
surge, “Sovereignty and Symbolism,” began in the wake of the Manhattan 
voyages (1969-70) and continued until 1980. Chapters 11-12 analyze political 
and military responses during the early years of the Trudeau government. 
Eyre suggested that a third surge, “The Land of Tomorrow,” began with the 
1987 White Paper on defence. The point of origin is better placed with the 
Polar Sea controversy and the Mulroney government’s landmark September 
1985 statement, which Rob Huebert describes in chapter 13. This final Cold 
War surge dissipated with the 1988 election, soon after Eyre published his 
article. The most recent surge of interest in the early twenty-first century 
does not have an obvious starting point, but the academic debates between 
Huebert and Franklyn Griffiths (chapters 15-16) began to frame the issues in 
2002, and Arctic sovereignty and security issues attracted widespread public 
attention with the Hans Island debacle in 2004. The conclusion reflects upon 
how the historical cases analyzed in this volume relate to current debates 
about sovereignty and security issues.
Setting the Stage: From Confederation to the Second World War
One hundred and thirty years ago, Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic 
lands and waters was far from secure. The young Dominion inherited the 
islands of the High Arctic archipelago from Britain in 1880 not because it 
asked for them, but because Britain wanted to transfer responsibility for its 
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nebulous rights after it received “two apparently innocent requests for con-
cessions of arctic territory in 1874.”5 Canada proceeded to ignore the Arctic 
for the next quarter century, until the Klondike Gold Rush. In the early twen-
tieth century, the government sent official missions to the Arctic to explore 
and to collect customs duties and licensing fees from whalers – a modest 
assertion of Canadian legal authority. In the interwar years, Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) posts dotted the northern landscape, suggesting 
a continuous presence.6 There was little cause for worry about lands and 
islands once Canadian negotiators reached agreements with Denmark and 
Norway to settle terrestrial sovereignty claims by 1930. American explorers 
complied with Canadian regulations, and geography seemed to preclude 
any military threat.7
 Bernd Horn, in the first chapter to this volume, furnishes a sweeping 
overview of the relationship between sovereignty and security since the 
interwar period. Although military leaders always acknowledged a certain 
degree of potential military threat to the Canadian Arctic, they always con-
sidered the likelihood of invasion to be remote. Accordingly, Horn argues 
that Canadian decisions regarding Northern defence were preoccupied 
with preserving sovereignty against American encroachments. This dy-
namic, referred to elsewhere as “defence against help,” reflected an inescap-
able dilemma for a small state bordering on a large neighbour. Geostrategic 
interdependence meant that the larger power, with security interests related 
to the territory of its smaller neighbour, actually posed a sovereignty threat 
to the smaller neighbour. If the larger power perceived an existential threat, 
it would take whatever actions it deemed necessary to protect its own in-
terests by “helping its neighbour,” with or without the smaller state’s con-
sent. Therefore, acting out of its own self-interest, the small state needed to 
persuade its larger neighbour that it could defend against larger enemies, 
thus diminishing the likelihood of unsolicited military assistance on or over 
its territory and adjacent waters.8 Reciprocal Canadian-American defence 
pledges in the late 1930s established that Canadian and American contin-
ental defence interests were indeed intertwined. As long as decision-makers 
considered Canada to be a “fireproof house,” insulated from European and 
Asian conflagrations by distance and isolation, the issue remained academic 
rather than practical.
 The Second World War brought the Canadian Northwest into new 
strategic focus. The Americans were worried about overland and air routes 
to Alaska and once they “decided what was necessary, they took prompt 
action with little regard for Canadian sensitivities,” Horn suggests. Canada 
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had little choice but to agree, and entered into agreements with Canada 
to build airfields, a highway and an oil pipeline in the northwest. When 
American personnel swept into the Canadian North to complete these 
tasks, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King became paranoid that 
American developments, taken in the name of military security, would 
undermine Canadian sovereignty. American plans proceeded ahead of 
Canadian permissions, and a lack of sensitivity to Canadian concerns 
prompted the King government to take political steps to “re-Canadianize” 
the Arctic. The rationale was not defence, but safeguarding sovereignty 
from infringements by its wartime ally and closest neighbour. At war’s end, 
the Americans pulled out of Canada and, at Ottawa’s request, the owner-
ship of permanent facilities in the North passed into Canadian hands. As 
a result, Canada emerged unscathed in terms of territorial ownership, but 
senior officials certainly took note of the interdependency between security 
and sovereignty throughout the Cold War. The war also started an endur-
ing pattern: once American security interests and activities in the Arctic 
declined, so too did Canada’s efforts to assert its sovereignty and invest in 
Arctic security.9
 The impacts of militarism are not confined to high politics, diplomacy, 
and defence planning. In chapter 2, Ken Coates and William Morrison, the 
leading historians of the Canadian North, offer a succinct overview of the 
socio-economic impacts that the American “army of occupation” had in the 
Canadian Northwest. The influx of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 
civilian workers “almost instantly transformed” communities along the 
route of the wartime development projects, reconfiguring physical and cul-
tural geographies. Small villages grew into administrative, transportation, 
and construction hubs, while others off the new transportation routes – like 
Dawson – were fated to decline. Furthermore, although the western subarctic 
looked “unoccupied” on southerners’ maps, the Northwest has been the 
homeland to Native people since time immemorial. Most practiced a mixed 
economy, blending traditional subsistence lifestyles with fur trade oppor-
tunities. Despite their relative isolation, these cultures had already adapted 
to the presence of traders, miners, whalers, policemen, and the occasional 
bureaucrat. The sudden flood of newcomers contracted to undertake war-
time construction projects was unprecedented (at least since the Klondike 
Gold Rush), however, and the Alaska Highway left a mixed legacy that is 
richly described in the chapter – spanning employment, to sexual assaults, to 
disease, to environmental degradation. Most significantly over the long-term, 
Coates and Morrison argue, the wartime projects “awakened the Canadian 
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government to its responsibilities toward the Northwest” and drew the re-
gion and its peoples into the web of the state.
The First Surge: Northern Approaches, 1947-64
The onset of the Cold War renewed pressures on Canada to balance sover-
eignty concerns with continental security imperatives. Polar projection maps 
revealed how Canada’s strategic situation had changed when the United 
States and the Soviet Union became rivals. Arctic defences were inextric-
ably linked to American security, and the United States pushed for access to 
Canada’s Far North to build airfields and weather stations. Canadian officials 
grew apprehensive and cautious in authorizing new installations, whereas 
the Americans were anxious to proceed. Journalists began to talk about a 
looming sovereignty crisis, and scholars cite this era as further evidence that 
the Americans were willing to encroach on Canadian sovereignty to achieve 
their ends.10 
 A main debate over the sovereignty-security equilibrium in immedi-
ate postwar Canada has led scholars like Shelagh Grant to track popular 
media statements and political activists concerned about allegedly sinister 
American intentions for Canada’s Arctic. According to this line of thinking, 
Canadian apathy in the face of American security interests threatened our 
sovereignty in the late 1940s.11 Other historians have painted a more benign 
portrait of bilateral cooperation.12 They suggest that Canadian interests were 
not undermined by American security imperatives, and sovereignty and se-
curity interests were balanced in and even strengthened by postwar negotia-
tions. 
 In chapter 3, Peter Kikkert supports the argument that the Canadian 
government succeeded in securing its interests and its sovereignty in its 
postwar negotiations with Washington. Given its geopolitical position, it 
was necessary for Canada to cooperate with the United States in the Arctic. 
The necessity of a more intense and enduring relationship to meet the emer-
ging Soviet threat was apparent by 1946. In the negotiations that followed, 
Ottawa feared for Canadian sovereignty, but did not give into the barrage 
of American requests for new activity in the Canadian arctic. Although 
the United States government harboured no malevolent designs for the 
Canadian arctic, international events in Antarctica and elsewhere prevented 
it from explicitly recognizing Canada’s sector claim. Recognizing American 
limitations, the Canadian government decided against making sovereignty 
claims that would have guaranteed a critical American response. Instead, 
Canadian and American officials engaged in quiet diplomacy through es-
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tablished diplomatic and military channels during 1946, and ultimately set a 
course that would satisfy both countries’ concerns. Indeed, Canada secured 
greater American recognition of its Arctic sovereignty than previously, and 
Kikkert’s intricate description of bilateral discussions confirms his earlier 
observation that “informal networks and mutual accommodation of inter-
ests solidified a relationship that was built on cooperation, respect, and open 
dialogue.”13 
 In chapter 4, David Bercuson assesses bilateral relations over how to 
manage publicity related to Arctic defence projects from 1946-48. Newspaper 
and magazine stories on sensitive joint defence projects pushed the subject 
onto the agenda of high level bilateral meetings, and encouraged senior 
diplomats and military officials to sort out their defence partnership and 
public statements about defence plans for the Arctic. Canadian officials ac-
knowledged that they could not maintain complete secrecy, and decided to 
emphasize the “civilian benefits” of the various projects while downplaying 
US activities. This “subterfuge,” Bercuson explains, did not allay the wor-
ries of journalists like Leslie Roberts (or members of the Opposition in 
parliament) that American pressures to occupy the Canadian Arctic would 
undermine Canadian sovereignty. Press leaks and unfavourable publicity 
encouraged both governments to develop principles guiding the release 
of information regarding continental defence projects, which ensured that 
Ottawa and Washington would approve in advance any public announce-
ments. Although “press stories that had no basis in fact or which implied 
that Canada was compromising its sovereignty in the Arctic and elsewhere 
would continue to appear through the years,” Bercuson observed, bilateral 
arrangements ensured that the release of information would not be wielded 
against Canada’s interests. Canada set the agenda and led the way in this 
episode, challenging “the long-standing myth ... that the US consistently bul-
lied, bludgeoned, and blasted Canada to do its bidding.”
 American security considerations also intersected with Canada’s mari-
time domain. Although Canada is a coastal state bordered by three oceans, its 
official motto a mari usque ad mare only refers to two. The Canadian navy has 
traditionally mirrored this national emphasis on the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
The Royal Navy was at the forefront of the epic search for a Northwest Passage 
(NWP) in the mid-nineteenth century which, after great cost and frustration, 
led to the “discovery” of one-half of the Arctic and three northwest pas-
sages.14 By the end of that century, however, the viability of the route as a 
passage to the Orient was dismissed. Norweigan explorer Roald Amundsen’s 
1903-6 transit of the Passage was not repeated until Henry Larsen’s transits in 
7P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER
the RCMP schooner St Roch in 1940 and 1942,15 and for the first four decades 
of its existence no Canadian government or admiral dispatched any element 
of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to Canada’s Arctic seas. 
 After the Second World War, Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel explains in chapter 
5, the RCN was downsized dramatically and had to choose between concen-
trating its resources in either the Atlantic or the Arctic Ocean. It chose the for-
mer, and while Canada pondered its needs and options in the early postwar 
period the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard sailed into the far north on a series of 
exercises designed to increase military knowledge and operating capabilities 
in the Arctic. The emotional appeal of the region – and attempts to draw 
attention to its dwindling numbers and budget – eventually drove the RCN 
to conduct a Northern Cruise in September 1948, which saw the aircraft car-
rier Magnificent and two destroyers venture into Hudson Strait and then the 
destroyers into Hudson Bay. Although the Canadian media made much of 
this cruise and a subsequent voyage by the frigate HMCS Swansea the follow-
ing year, these operations demonstrated the futility of spreading the RCN’s 
resources too thinly. Although the Minister of National Defence announced 
Canada’s intention to build a naval patrol vessel (eventually commissioned 
as the icebreaker HMCS Labrador), the RCN’s Arctic foray was brief. The RCN 
had little operational interest in the North, and the Labrador was an anomaly 
in an anti-submarine navy. Thus the RCN focused on the Atlantic theatre, 
and opted out of an Arctic role by 1957 when it transferred the Labrador to the 
coast guard.16
 Several chapters explain how the resupply of Arctic military installa-
tions prompted intense bilateral discussions after the Second World War. The 
Joint Arctic Weather Stations – which were designed, build, and operated by 
the Americans in the early postwar years – were a prime example. Gordon 
Smith, for example, traced bilateral negotiations wherein Canada went from 
reluctance and caution to assume growing responsibility for the stations, 
eventually taking the lead in maintenance and resupply. “So far as the JAWS 
enterprise itself is concerned, it clearly ranks as one of the most important 
and successful examples of U.S.-Canadian joint endeavour in northern re-
gions during the World War II and postwar years,” Smith concluded. “In 
sum, it was a striking illustration of successful international cooperation 
and collaboration.”17 Legal scholar Nigel Bankes notes that the Joint Arctic 
Weather Station Agreement “thus ended the last potential legal threat to 
Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic lands.”18
 In chapter 6, “Clenched in the JAWS of America,” Daniel Heidt integrates 
this traditional focus on diplomacy but also analyzes what happened “on the 
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ground.” The Second World War demonstrated that greater meteorological 
knowledge of Canada’s arctic was necessary, but Canada did not have the 
resources to mount a proper program itself. Instead, Canada and the United 
States jointly constructed and operated five stations in the Canadian arctic. 
While American officials sometimes ignored Canadian wishes, such actions 
only occurred in the early years and were quickly rectified by Canadian 
officials in Ottawa. It was the press, rather than the conduct of American 
officials, that most worried the Canadian government. On the whole, Heidt’s 
research confirms that the program epitomized a successful bilateral rela-
tionship: it buttressed Canada’s Arctic sovereignty while satisfying the sci-
entific requirements of the United States. 
 As the Cold War heated up in the 1950s, the Americans sought extensive 
air defence systems extending to the northernmost reaches of the continent, 
launching yet another round of “crisis” rhetoric. The first radar networks – the 
Pinetree Line, built across the northern United States and southern Canada 
at about the 50th parallel, and Mid-Canada Line (or McGill Fence), which 
Canada built and operated along the 55th parallel – did not raise concerns 
about Arctic sovereignty. By contrast, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, 
built across the 70th parallel, was the boldest mega-project in Arctic history. 
In chapter 7, Alexander Herd’s careful assessment of the primary evidence 
reveals that the Canadian government did not passively subordinate its 
continental defence policy to that of the United States when it negotiated 
joint arrangements to construct the DEW Line. Although the United States 
designed and paid for the radar network, Canadian political and military 
officials withstood American pressure and protected their national interests. 
American plans had to secure Canadian consent, and the terms and condi-
tions read, in Herd’s assessment, “read like a litany of Canadian sovereignty 
sensitivities and desire for control.” The United States granted Canadian 
contractors, commercial air carriers, and shippers equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the construction phase, “to the fullest extent practicable.” This idea 
of practicability served as a guiding principle for Canadian participation in 
the DEW Line project more generally. 
 The complete story of the DEW Line remains to be written. Its construc-
tion, completed in just over two years, “was an extraordinary feat of geo-
graphical engineering, planned and sequenced in minute detail,” historical 
geographer Matthew Farish observed.19 The project dramatically altered the 
military, logistic and demographic characteristics of the North American 
Arctic. Although Canadian officials negotiated a favourable agreement that 
protected Canada’s sovereignty and secured economic benefits for Canadian 
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companies, journalists and opposition politicians suggested throughout the 
construction and operational phases that Canada lacked practical control over 
its northland. The DEW Line, in the words of Maclean’s editor Ralph Allen, was 
“the charter under which a tenth of Canada may very well become the world’s 
most northerly banana republic.”20 This dire forecast proved erroneous, but 
there is debate on whether Canada protected its interests effectively. Historian 
Adam Lajeunesse, for example, cites a 1964 report by defence liaison officer 
J.C. Brown that Canada’s sovereignty on the Line was like “the Cheshire cat’s 
smile from Alice in Wonderland; it had become little more than an illusion 
which gradually disappeared if you looked hard enough.”21 Another reading 
of the evidence suggests that the countries effectively managed bilateral prob-
lems related to the DEW Line.22 After visiting the Line in 1969, Eric Wang of the 
Department of National Defence’s (DND) legal department noted that jour-
nalists who had taken “masochistic pleasure” in decrying American control 
and dwelling on potential sovereignty encroachments were both misleading 
and unfounded in the evidence. “Indeed we might be tempted to congratu-
late ourselves […] for enjoying a ‘free ride’ at least in this area of our defense 
activities on our own soil, without any unpleasant side effects,” Wang noted 
in his report.23 While there were no side effects in terms of sovereignty, there 
certainly were lasting cultural and environmental impacts.24
 The DEW Line and previous military development projects reshaped the 
socio-economic and cultural geographies of Arctic Canada. “The outlook of 
the Eskimos … has been changing since the construction of the northern air-
fields, the weather and radar stations, and the D.E.W. Line, opened their eyes 
to the advantages of wage-employment,” anthropologist Diamond Jenness 
observed in 1964.25 Although planners had intended to protect the Inuit so 
that military activities did not disrupt their lives, this proved impossible 
once airplanes and ships began shipping southern materiel into the Arctic. 
“Every place a box landed became a beach-head for industrialized society,” 
documentary filmmaker Kevin McMahon later observed. “The boxes soon 
became the foundation for the Canadian government, which the military 
had given cause to worry about its sovereignty. Boxes were added, and more 
of our society – with its various virtues and vices, machines and organiza-
tions, ideals, morals, values and goals – were shipped north.”26 By-products 
of military development (airfields, beach landing sites, improved charts and 
maps, and navigation aids) all significantly improved access to what had 
been a virtually inaccessible area. Indeed, promoters of northern develop-
ment in the late 1950s anticipated a flood of mineral exploration now that the 
military had “opened up” the Arctic. 
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 In chapter 8, Ken Eyre describes how a wide variety of Cold War mil-
itary projects contributed to general knowledge about the North and to social 
infrastructure. While some activities were purely military (and thus develop-
ment spin-offs were accidental), most defence projects were designed and 
implemented to maximize northern development. Eyre illuminates these 
contributions through a series of case studies. He begins with the largely 
unknown role of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals in the Northwest 
Territories and Yukon Radio System, first established in the interwar years, 
which supported industrial development and humanitarian efforts. In 1946, 
the Canadian Army took over the responsibility for the maintenance of the 
Canadian portion of the Alaska Highway. Improvements in the road network 
“fostered a modest amount of economic development and resource exploita-
tion in northern British Columbia and the Yukon,” Eyre observed, “but there 
was no great boom of development as some optimists had forecast when the 
road was built.” Nevertheless, the military’s responsibilities in running the 
highway had a major social impact, particularly in Whitehorse which hosted 
the Northwest Highway System headquarters, a military communications 
research facility, and an airbase. It developed into the first, substantial garri-
son town in the North. The military even devised Native training programs 
to contribute to national development “beyond the frontier.” When the mil-
itary withdrew from the North in the early 1960s, however, these military 
development projects were cancelled and communities like Whitehorse, 
Churchill, and Frobisher Bay were hit hard socially and economically. 
 The early postwar surge of military interest in the Arctic lasted just over 
a decade. Eyre, in his groundbreaking thesis on the military in the Canadian 
North, observed:
Military interest in the North peaked in the late 1950s and dimin-
ished rapidly thereafter, as the world entered the missile era. The 
Navy gradually stopped its northern summer cruises. Army 
exercises ceased. The radio system and the Alaska Highway were 
turned over to civil departments of government. The Canadian 
Rangers were left to wither on the vine. Aerial surveillance 
flights were curtailed. In the later part of the Diefenbaker years, 
Canadian defence policy was dominated by the three “Ns” of 
NORAD, NATO and nuclear weapons. Lester Pearson’s Liberal 
administration during the following five years completed the 
process of withdrawal. By 1965, only the DEW Line stations re-
mained.27 
11
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER
With the decline of American security interest in its Northern lands, Canada 
lost the imperative to “defend against help.” Now that technological advan-
ces shifted the continental defence emphasis from static radar lines to satel-
lites and ballistic missile submarines, Canada could safely reduce its military 
presence in the region without concern that this would undermine its de facto 
sovereignty over its Arctic lands.
 The legal status of the Arctic waters posed a more intractable dilemma 
than questions of terrestrial sovereignty, and questions about the Northwest 
Passage persisted through the 1960s. In his chapter on Canadian policy re-
garding Arctic waters from the late 1940s to the Manhattan voyages, Adam 
Lajeunesse suggests that the government’s inconsistent, hesitant, and ad hoc 
approach was less effective than recent scholars have suggested. The grad-
ualist or “‘wait and see’ approach which successive Canadian governments 
hoped would strengthen their position in fact accomplished the opposite,” 
Lajeunesse argues, “and the policy of carefully building a precedent of 
Canadian sovereignty was in fact no policy at all but rather the ad hoc reac-
tions of a government with no consistent direction” or clear political will. 
Rather than implementing its undeclared policy to draw straight baselines 
around the Arctic archipelago, politicians sent contradictory signals about 
Canada’s claims and thus weakened their foundation. The opaque approach 
to maritime sovereignty only worked as long as the United States remained 
disinterested in the NWP. When an American challenge did come, Lajeunesse 
argues, Canada was unprepared.
The Second Surge: Sovereignty and Symbolism, 1970-80
The issue came to a head at the end of the decade. In 1969, American-owned 
Humble Oil sent the Manhattan icebreaker through the NWP to determine if 
it was a viable commercial shipping route for oil and gas from the Beaufort 
Sea. The Canadian media reported the voyage as a direct challenge to 
Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. “The legal status of the waters of Canada’s 
Arctic archipelago is not at issue in the proposed transit of the Northwest 
Passage by the ships involved in the Manhattan project,” Prime Minister 
Trudeau reassured the House of Commons on 15 May 1969. His government 
“welcomed the Manhattan exercise, has concurred in it and will participate 
in it.”28 After all, Humble Oil’s request for Canadian cooperation seemed to 
imply that the passage was Canadian, but the US State Department would 
not say so specifically.29 A crisis mentality developed; according to Maxwell 
Cohen in 1970, the Manhattan voyages “made Canadians feel that they were 
on the edge of another American [... theft] of Canadian resources and rights 
which had to be dealt with at once by firm governmental action.”30 
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 In chapter 10, Matthew Willis critically analyzes the Liberal govern-
ment’s response to the Manhattan voyages. He argues that its decision to cast 
the Arctic in environmentalist terms – Canada needed to extend its juris-
diction northward to ensure that foreign vessels did not pollute this deli-
cate ecosystem – reflected the views and values of Prime Minister Trudeau 
and his closest advisors. In turn, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(AWPPA) allowed Canada to regulate and control future tanker traffic 
through the NWP by creating a pollution prevention zone one hundred 
nautical miles outside the archipelago as well as the waters between the 
islands. The Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act extended Canada’s territorial 
sea to 12 miles, subjecting the waters leading into the Passage to Canadian 
control.  Although Trudeau considered this to be a show of “legal modera-
tion,” the Americans were furious and announced that Canada’s unilateral 
actions were unjustified in international law. Canadian critics suggested 
that Ottawa’s refusal to declare outright that the archipelagic waters are “in-
ternal” showed indecisiveness and weakness. In his careful reappraisal of 
the evidence, Willis observes that the federal response “was the product of 
a shrewd and reasoned assessment of the available options, and a creative 
and original conceptualization of the national interest.” Politics is the art 
of the possible, and Ottawa’s “soft-pedalling” blunted a potential American 
sovereignty challenge while affording it room to manoeuvre. “The deci-
sion to use pollution-control measures and an extended territorial sea as the 
vehicle embodied the Trudeauvian conviction that foreign policy be guided 
first and foremost by domestic policy,” Willis concludes, “with the exercise of 
sovereignty being the means of advancing a country’s interests, not an end in 
itself.” 
 If exercising sovereignty was a means rather than an end, what was 
the role of the military in the Arctic? In chapter 11, Whitney Lackenbauer 
and Peter Kikkert draw upon recently declassified correspondence between 
National Defence and the Legal Division at External Affairs from 1968-72 
to explore the relationship between military activities, presence, and Arctic 
sovereignty. During this period, defence planners emphasized the need for 
a persistent presence in the North and argued that surveillance was integral 
to the affirmation of Canada’s legal claims. External Affairs officials took a 
different view, suggesting that defence planners confused issues of control, 
enforcement, and protection of Canada’s jurisdiction in Arctic waters with 
the legal basis for Canada’s claims. Despite political statements suggesting 
that a military presence and surveillance were necessary to assert Canadian 
sovereignty, legal officers insisted that they were not a basis for sovereignty. 
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Erik Wang, for example, questioned what an expanded Canadian Forces role 
meant for sovereignty. His careful analyses emphasized the legal, economic 
and political dimensions of sovereignty, while questioning its articulation as 
“a military problem.” Accordingly, surveillance and patrolling did not per-
fect Canada’s sovereignty position, and Wang and his colleagues suggested 
that a “presence for the sake of presence” – merely to satisfy the “optical 
demands” of political sovereignty – was not sustainable. Instead, External 
Affairs emphasized that the military’s role in support of sovereignty had to 
be grounded in functional contributions. Increased levels of defence activity 
had to be based upon a clear sense of purpose, developed with attentiveness 
to probable threats, our allies, and other government departments with oper-
ational responsibilities in the Arctic. In the end, Lackenbauer and Kikkert 
suggest, “National Defence proceeded to develop a role for the [Canadian 
Forces] around the protection of sovereignty, predicated on a short-term 
sovereignty crisis that soon dissipated.” 
 While Canada increased its tempo of military activities in the North 
during the 1970s to “show the flag,” the “shifting sands” of political sover-
eignty did not sustain them into the next decade. Ken Eyre has shown that 
the government not only avoided stationing regular forces in the north, it 
did not obtain any new equipment for the Forces. “In the 1920s, Canada es-
tablished sovereignty in the Arctic with a symbolic presence of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police,” he observed. “In the 1970s, Canada prepared 
to protect that same sovereignty with a symbolic presence of the Canadian 
Armed Forces.” An important difference, however, was that the southern 
military units that operated in the north were transient and did not enjoy 
the focused, functional tasks that the RCMP had earlier. Nevertheless, by 
1975, “the Canadian Forces had re-established themselves in the North to an 
unprecedented degree,” and for the first time, the Department of National 
Defence was prepared to admit that the North had an intrinsic value to the 
country as a whole.”31 When the NWP proved unfeasible for commercial 
transit, national interest in Arctic sovereignty abated. The military’s sym-
bolic presence was no longer a priority, and its activities began to slacken by 
the early 1980s. Indeed, although initially opposed to the AWPPA, the United 
States supported Canadian-sponsored article 234 of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which gave coastal states “the right to adopt 
and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas 
within the limits of the exclusive economic zone.”32 Although Canada did not 
ratify the convention until 2003 (and the United States has not yet done so), 
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both countries considered it customary international law on the subject. This 
vindicated Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and gave it “the de 
facto right to legislate control over the type of commercial vessels that enter 
the Passage.”33 
The Third Surge: The Land of Tomorrow, 1985-1988
The August 1985 voyage of the United States Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea, 
for reasonable operational reasons relating to the resupply of the American 
base at Thule, Greenland, launched another Canadian “crisis” over the NWP. 
The Americans refused to seek official permission from Canada, recognizing 
that this would prejudice their own legal position. In response, the Mulroney 
government announced that Canada was officially implementing straight 
baselines around the Arctic Archipelago effective 1 January 1986, thus claim-
ing full sovereignty over the NWP as “historic, internal waters.” Concurrently, 
it outlined an aggressive plan to exercise control over its waters and assert 
its Arctic sovereignty, including a “Polar 8” icebreaker, new maritime patrol 
aircraft, a new northern training centre, improved northern airfields, a dozen 
nuclear-powered attack submarines and a fixed sonar detection system at the 
entrances to the Passage. It also promised to negotiate with the United States 
− a prudent move that, owing to Mulroney’s close relationship with President 
Ronald Reagan, yielded the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement requiring 
Canadian consent for US icebreaker transits. By “agreeing to disagree” on the 
legal status of the Passage, the two countries reached “a pragmatic solution 
based on our special bilateral relationship, our common interest in cooperat-
ing on Arctic matters, and the nature of the area” that did not prejudice either 
country’s legal position nor set a precedent for other areas of the world.34
 In chapter 12, political scientist Rob Huebert critically examines the for-
mulation of Canadian maritime Arctic policy after the Polar Sea controversy. 
He concludes that while initiatives intended to establish the legal regime for 
Canadian waters, apply Canadian law over these waters, formalize bilateral 
relations regarding the Passage, and develop means to protect the waters 
and enforce Canadian laws and regulations appeared to represent a coherent 
suite of policy, they were actually the typical result of an ad hoc and reactive 
process to a specific event initiated by a non-Canadian actor in the Canadian 
Arctic. Minister of External Affairs Joe Clark’s 10 September 1985 announce-
ment of six policy initiatives formed the core elements of Canadian maritime 
Arctic policy for the remainder of the decade, but they were largely being 
developed for other reasons and were packaged together in a “crisis environ-
ment.” As a result, they were implemented with varying degrees of success. 
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The Polar 8 icebreaker project, for example, which would have given Canada 
the most powerful icebreaker in the world and a capability to operate in most 
of its waters throughout the year, was cancelled for budgetary reasons. 
 The 1988 federal election campaign, fought over free trade and deficit 
reduction, foretold the demise of these sweeping commitments to invest-
ments in defence. The Mulroney government announced on 27 April 1989 
that it would not proceed with acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. The 
fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Eastern Bloc prompted Western 
governments to re-evaluate their security assumptions. One by one, its other 
planned military acquisitions announced to support Arctic sovereignty 
were cut. More pressing national priorities – particularly a growing national 
debt – seemed to trump Arctic issues. Post-Cold War promises of a “peace 
dividend,” and few military threats on the northern horizon, meant that 
Canadian Forces’ capabilities in the North were allowed to atrophy in the 
1990s.35 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union, Huebert observed, shifted attention 
from traditional to new security concerns, particularly the protection of 
the Arctic environment and its indigenous populations.36 Aboriginal land 
claim settlements, court decisions, and increasing international attention 
to indigenous issues gave Arctic residents increasingly powerful political 
platforms upon which to voice their priorities. Inuit and Dene leaders com-
plained that military activities, undertaken in the name of national security 
and sovereignty, had historically harmed their communities. Mary Simon, 
president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), tried to broaden con-
cepts of Arctic security, asserting that it included “environmental, economic 
and cultural, as well as defence, aspects.” She insisted that “Inuit have a 
legitimate, extensive and varied role to fulfill in international matters. In 
light of the increasing impact of the actions of the international community 
on Inuit rights, our culture and northern homeland, we have a compelling 
responsibility to become increasingly involved.”37 By contrast, military pro-
jects tended to be “centralized undertakings that are unilaterally imposed 
on indigenous peoples and their territories.” Simon noted that these prac-
tices were “inconsistent with the basic principles of aboriginal self-govern-
ment.”38
 The one exception was the Canadian Rangers, an unorthodox com-
ponent of the Canadian Forces with high rates of Aboriginal participation 
that not only survived the budget cuts but grew in the 1990s. In chapter 13, 
Whitney Lackenbauer traces the history of Aboriginal involvement in this 
part-time, unpaid volunteer force from 1947-2005. Armed with only a .303 
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rifle, an annual allotment of ammunition and an armband, the Rangers acted 
as “the eyes and ears” of the Canadian Forces in remote regions throughout 
the Cold War. The military benefited from having Rangers with an intimate 
knowledge of the local environment and cultures who guided and advised 
regular forces on exercises in the north, and provided a permanent presence 
in support of Canadian sovereignty and security. Members of the Rangers at-
tracted renewed attention in the early-1970s when Arctic sovereignty became 
a resurgent issue and the military launched initiatives to increase Aboriginal 
peoples’ representation in the armed forces. Northern Aboriginal persons 
who served in the Rangers could remain in and serve their communities 
while at the same time contributing to national defence. The Rangers pro-
vide a visible assertion of sovereignty at minimal cost, and have flourished in 
the post-Cold War era. By the turn of the new millennium, patrols spanned 
the breadth of the Arctic and represented every Aboriginal group in the 
territorial north. The Rangers’ interactions with regular and reserve force 
units also contribute to greater cross-cultural awareness and the sharing of 
invaluable survival skills. Lackenbauer portrays the Canadian Rangers as a 
genuine success story on the local and national levels, bridging the civilian 
and military realms.39 
 Overall, however, Ottawa’s attention turned away from prospective 
military conflict towards prospects for circumpolar cooperation. In 1989, 
Mulroney had formally proposed the idea of a regional forum for Arctic 
cooperation with Russian authorities. Two years later, eight Arctic countries 
signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), creating a 
forum to work on Arctic-wide environmental regulation and management.40 
Canada played a significant role in pushing the international community 
toward a broader and more influential Arctic Council, which was created in 
1996.41 “A true partnership has emerged where Arctic states and Indigenous 
peoples have, together, developed a vision for the Arctic where national agen-
das can be harmonized and cultural diversity encouraged,” Foreign Affairs 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy proclaimed at its inaugural meeting in September 
1998. “This has allowed us to work effectively on the substantive challenge 
of achieving equitable development in the Arctic while protecting and 
promoting its environmental integrity.”42 At the Americans’ insistence the 
Council did not discuss military matters, but this did not worry the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 
It reported in April 1997 that “the new agenda for security cooperation” 
was “inextricably linked to the aims of environmentally sustainable human 
development.” Circumpolar security would now prioritize “the well-being 
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of Arctic peoples and to safeguarding northern habitants from intrusions 
which have impinged aggressively on them.”43 These safeguards included 
cleaning up the environmental legacies of the Cold War, in Canada and 
abroad.44 Although Ottawa did not act on recommendations to push to make 
the Arctic a nuclear-free zone, and even to demilitarize the region,45 few com-
mentators anticipated armed conflict in the region. Officials clearly believed 
that constructive engagement, not confrontation, would mark the twenty-
first century. 
The New Millennium: Debating Sovereignty, Security and 
Stewardship
Growing concerns about climate change, the opening of the NWP, global de-
mands for Arctic resources and security in the post-911 world have conspired 
to put the Arctic back on the national and international agenda. The key de-
bate in the last decade revolves around two basic positions. “Purveyors of 
polar peril”46 suggest that Canadian sovereignty and security was imperiled 
by climate change and concomitant interest in the Arctic. Their arguments, 
generally characterized as alarmist, emphasize that urgent action is neces-
sary because Canada’s Arctic capabilities are insufficient to project control 
over its Arctic lands and waters at a time when our sovereignty is likely to 
be challenged. In a break with past practice, this latest sovereignty crisis is in 
anticipation of what may lie ahead: an Arctic future marked by friction over 
unclear maritime boundaries, increasing competition for resources, and mil-
itary posturing. On the other side, more optimistic scholars point to the legal 
framework provided by UNCLOS, downplay the probability of military and 
commercial threats to Canadian sovereignty, and point to stable alliances 
and multilateral organizations (like the Arctic Council and the International 
Maritime Organization) which promote constructive international engage-
ment and cooperative management. The final two chapters in this volume, 
by the leading proponents of these positions, launched the debate about the 
nature of the threats to Canadian sovereignty and security in the region, and 
which policy options are most likely to yield an appropriate and sustainable 
Arctic strategy.
 Chapter 14 reproduces Rob Huebert’s influential article (first published 
in 2002) which boldly argued that climate change in the Arctic is a serious 
challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security. Continued thinning 
of the ice cover in the Northwest Passage would make commercial shipping 
and other forms of international activity more viable in the region, he sug-
gested, which would challenge Canadian of its Arctic in two main respects. 
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First, current efforts by the Canadian government to maintain Canadian 
sovereignty over the NWP were unlikely to succeed in the face of external 
challenges to its legal position. Second, Canada would need to substantially 
rethink its enforcement and surveillance capabilities in the Arctic, and re-
quired significant investments in these areas to enhance control over its Arctic 
domain. These ideas underpinned the “sovereignty on thinning ice” thesis 
that Huebert further developed in subsequent articles, which suggested that 
Canada needed to take unilateral action to assert its control and defend its 
sovereignty or its claims would be overwhelmed by rival interests.47 
 Political scientist Franklyn Griffiths’ rebuttal (chapter 15) contests the 
widespread belief that climate change and Arctic sea-ice reduction are likely 
to produce a commercial-shipping challenge to Canadian sovereignty over 
the NWP. In his careful assessment, ice-condition variability and container-
ship economics will not make Canadian Arctic waters a viable alternative to 
the Suez Canal much before mid-century, by which time the more attract-
ive option of Arctic transpolar navigation may also be available. Griffiths 
shows that the potential for occasional voyages of rogue, tramp, and non-
cargo ships in the Archipelago could give rise to new Canadian security and 
law-enforcement requirements, but not to any great sovereignty challenge. 
Indeed, he suggests that the United States is not eager to undermine Canada’s 
position on the NWP, and he urges Canada to approach the United States to 
work out a new Arctic-waters regime based in part on the recognition that, 
from a homeland-security perspective, Canadian law and law enforcement 
are preferable to international straits status for the Passage. (In subsequent 
writing, he would emphasize that a bilateral “agree to disagree” approach 
remains the most viable option.) Finally, Griffiths urges a reinterpretation of 
Arctic sovereignty to focus on stewardship and Inuit leadership at a time of 
increased accessibility and geopolitical change. 
 Huebert and Griffiths’s ongoing debate has framed much of the ongoing 
scholarly, political and media discussion. Griffiths, after decades of study-
ing the issue (and, ironically, authoring the Globe and Mail commentary that 
broke the Polar Sea controversy to the public in 1985), observed that:
Hand wringing about loss of the Arctic is part of the Canadian 
way. Somehow we never get beyond it to collective action that 
works. In part, this is because good judgement and a fixation on 
sovereignty do not sit well together.... A predisposition to im-
moderate and unjustified fear for Arctic sovereignty requires us 
to exaggerate the threats we face. It chokes the consideration of 
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alternative courses of action. In its small way it stifles ambition 
and adds unwarranted apprehension to life in this country. If we 
cannot leave it fully behind, we should at least reduce its hold on 
us.
Reducing this hold requires a better awareness of what has transpired his-
torically. How we perceive the present, and how we anticipate the future, is 
framed by our understandings of the past. The conclusions to this volume re-
flect upon the themes and questions raised in the chapters in light of current 
sovereignty and security discussions. We hope that a stronger awareness of 
historical relationships, and more sober appraisal of Canadian requirements 
in light of past experiences, will help policy-makers frame coherent sover-
eignty and security strategies which are grounded in “lessons learned,” deal 
with uncertainty, and seize opportunities in an evolving circumpolar world. 
P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Otterville, Ontario, Canada
July 2010
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